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JUSTICE, EXPEDIENCY, AND BEAUTY*
Louis B. SCHWARTZt
INTRODUCTION
This essay proposes three theses:
(i) that the concept of justice should play a larger part
in legal education, law practice, and judging than it pres-
ently does;
(ii) that justice is not merely a matter of economic effi-
ciency, or of social expediency, or of public policy in the
sense of pursuit of the greatest good for the greatest number;
on the contrary, the characteristic and overriding concern of
justice is fairness to the individual; and
(iii) that an important criterion of justice is aesthetic: a
just decision or statute will be beautiful in that it fits, is pro-
portionate to, or is "just right" for its setting and era.
I propose first to explain my use of the terms "justice," "expedi-
ency," and "beauty." I shall then examine implications of the thesis
that justice has an aesthetic dimension. There are implications for legal
education, for constitutional law, for torts, for lawyers' professional re-
sponsibility, for judges' duties and jurisdiction, for judicial review of
administrative regulation, and even for reorganization of the executive
branch of the government, especially the Department of Justice. Fi-
nally, I shall consider the relationship between justice and the press.
The press can either educate or corrupt the public's taste in matters of
justice. If, as I fear, the press often corrupts public taste -in such mat-
ters, a dangerous gap opens between the will of a misinformed citi-
zenry, on the one hand, and conscientious professional work by judges
and lawyers, on the other. At some point, the legitimacy of government
itself is undermined when the organs of justice are misperceived as the
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instruments of injustice.
I. DEFINITIONS
In our epoch, it has become almost embarrassing for teachers and
critics of law to speak in terms of "justice."' Talk of justice makes
many sophisticated people uncomfortable in the same way that posing
an issue of "morality" seems useless, old-fashioned, or hypocritical.
The terms "justice" and "morality" have become shopworn as a result
of overuse, both by the powerful to legitimize their preferred position in
society and by the bigoted to force their ideas on reluctant fellow citi-
zens. The words, however, would never have lent themselves to such
abuse if they did not have an enduring and powerful appeal to our
minds and emotions.
I shall, accordingly, not hesitate to make justice the central concept
of my jurisprudence. As will be seen below, justice is for me a complex
quality of fitness, proportionateness to the situation, responsiveness to
tradition as well as to the need for change, and sensitivity to both indi-
vidual hardship and the general good. Admittedly, justice so defined is
not precisely measurable. But many of the most important aspects of
our collective and individual lives, such as love, health, and patriotism,
are not quantifiable. They are not, however, on that account, less
significant.
Justice is an art, not a science. A legal decision, statute, or practice
must satisfy discriminating critics of the art of justice that it is beauti-
fully fitted and proportioned to the situation with which it deals. It
should be recognizably related to the traditions of the art, but transcend
its cliches. If the decision, statute, or practice is to qualify as truly great
art, it must arrest observers as one is arrested by commanding and
magnificent painting, music, or architecture. It will seem innovative
yet, once revealed, inevitable. It may be disturbing, even violently unac-
ceptable to uneducated tastes, but unprejudiced minds will come to see
it as a compelling manifestation of human creativity.
"Expediency," the second element in the title of this essay, is my
unflattering reference to "public policy." The concept of expediency as
a criterion of justice has dominated legal education and scholarly writ-
ing to the point where expediency and justice have been treated as the
1 See Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40, 43-44 (Kairys ed. 1982) [hereinafter THE POLIT-
ICS OF LAW] (explaining that law students are taught that their initial reaction of
outrage to unjust judicial results is "naive, nonlegal, [and] irrelevant").
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same thing.2 In this essay, I shall deprecate the equation of justice with
expediency on two principal grounds: (i) the fallibility of economics and
other social sciences (often combined with illusory certainty based on
statistics and graphs); and (ii) the logical impossibility that a social sci-
ence conclusion, however well founded, could dictate a judicial conclu-
sion, in view of the fact that justice is a function of many values which
are, and perhaps must be, ignored by the social sciences. If justice is a
function of A, B, C, D, and E (Expediency), it is wildly improbable
that J would equal E.3
In the following paragraphs, I shall discuss a few examples of the
confusion of justice with expediency. In so doing, I do not necessarily
indicate disagreement with the results reached, nor do I entirely ex-
clude public policy in weighing the justice of a decision. I intend only to
raise the consciousness of lawyers, law teachers, judges, and legislators:
they ought to be more aware than they are of the extent to which the
legal system has mistakenly assimilated justice to expediency.
The development of the law of torts provides an illustration. The
rise of the doctrine of negligence was linked to notions of expediency
and public policy. Useful business enterprises were not to be saddled
with the cost of injuries inevitably resulting from their operation unless
the business was mismanaged in some way that created more risk than
necessary for operation of the business. 4 Twentieth-century torts juris-
prudence takes a strikingly different tack, but one still based on expedi-
ency. The movement is toward liability without fault if shifting the loss
2 See Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra note 1, at 18, 36-37 (asserting that a blending of legal theory and free
market economics is "perhaps the most influential attempt" at providing support for
legal decisions).
I The point has not been overlooked by philosophers or lawyers. See R. EPSTEIN,
A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMATION OF TORT LAW 4
(1980); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 537-40
(1972); Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. U.L.
REV. 335, 338-40 (1981); Kalman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REG.,
Jan./Feb. 1981, at 33, 33-36; Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076-79 (1979); Sullivan, Economics and More
Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 1214, 1219-22 (1977). Cf Ackerman, Ackerman & Henderson, Uncertain
Search for Environmental Policy: The Costs and Benefits of Controlling Pollution
Along the Delaware River, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1225, 1228, 1252-56 (1973) (an exam-
ination of the pitfalls of "scientific" solutions and a consideration of the "inherent limi-
tations of the economist's analysis of the issue of environmental degradation").
4 See M. HOROWlTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
at 97-99 (1977); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 92-96, 107-10 (1980);
Hovenkamp, The Economics of Legal History, 67 MINN. L. REV. 645, 691-697 (1983);
see also Nolan & Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65
N.C.L. REV. 257, 257-261 (1987) (reviewing the initial hostile reception of American
law to concepts of strict liability).
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from plaintiff to defendant would promote optimal risk management
within the community. Thus, the issues governing tort law are those of
efficient accident avoidance, inclusion of all costs in product or activity
pricing, risk distribution, and minimization of transaction costs. The
justice of requiring or precluding compensation for damages inflicted by
a tortfeasor rarely enters the equation.5
Public utility law also illustrates the distinction between justice
and expediency. Typically, the law prescribes that utility rates shall be
"just" as well as "reasonable."' One might suppose that "reasonable"
is'such a comprehensive reference to all the considerations that enter
into a judgment of public interest as to make separate reference to jus-
tice unnecessary.7 What the dual requirement seems to be saying is
that, after the elements that go into a judgment of expediency have been
appropriately weighed and balanced, i.e., "due process" has been in
other respects satisfied, there remains a coordinate demand that the so-
lution adequately respond to the hardship involved for affected individ-
uals. The separate demand for justice is comparable to such specific
protections of individual rights as the Constitution affords in the Bill of
Rights or in the provision against the "taking" of private property
without "just compensation" no matter how urgent the public policy
5 See G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 24-31, 170 (1970); R. EPSTEIN,
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 27-28 (1980); Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43-44 (1960); Nolan & Ursin, supra note 4, at 286-89; Ursin,
Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises [One Step Beyond Rowland and
Greenman], 22 UCLA L. REV. 820, 829-837 (1975); infra notes 87-92 and accompa-
nying text; see generally Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the
Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649 (1984) (surveying
analytic and normative work in the field of law and economics).
6 See, e.g., Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1982)
(rates for sale of gas shall be "just and reasonable"); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 824d(a) (1982) (public utility rates for electric energy shall be "just and reasona-
ble"). The Interstate Commerce Act formerly prescribed the "just and reasonable"
standard. See Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 76-785, part 3, ch. 722, § 305, 54
Stat. 898, 934 (1940) ('just and reasonable" rates for water carriers), repealed by Pub.
L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337, 1468 (1978). In 1978, Congress deleted the reference to
justice. See Pub. L. No. 95-473, ch. 107, § 10701(a), 92 Stat. 1337, 1371 (1978) (rates
must be "reasonable") (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10701a (b)(1) (1982 &
West Supp. 1987)). This change may have reflected a judgment, consistent with some
judicial opinions, that "just" and "reasonable" were synonymous. See infra note 7.
However, it is significant that such a change in centuries-old terminology was made in
the context of legislation moving powerfully towards deregulation. The railroads' free-
dom to compete by drastic price-cutting, which might ordinarily be regarded as preda-
tory, was not to be chilled by considerations of justice to smaller transportation firms
selected as targets. See 49 U.S.C. § 10701a(c)(2) (1982 & West Supp. 1987) (creating
a conclusive presumption of legality of rates that exceed variable costs).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927)
("[Reasonableness] is used as a convenient summary of the dominant considerations
which control in the application of legal doctrines.").
B U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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need for the property.
The contrast between expediency and justice is worth emphasiz-
ing. A law or a decision may be unjust despite the fact that it promotes
the greatest good for the greatest number. An injustice does not lose its
abhorrent character merely because it may, in the words of economists,
increase the gross national product. We would instantly reject slavery
as unjust even if it could be proven that all, including the slaves, would
be better off in a material sense under such a system of inequality. 9 As
Justice Stevens has observed, "[I]t is the very purpose of a Bill of
Rights to identify values that may not be sacrificed to expediency."'1
"Beauty," the third element in the title of this essay, is an example
of a concept, like love or patriotism, that is essential and useful al-
though difficult to appraise and impossible to quantify. The argument
against its utility runs as follows: Beauty lies in the eye of the beholder,
and is so utterly subjective that it cannot contribute to the measurement
of justice. Moreover, beauty is hopelessly culture-bound. For an ancient
Chinese it may include deformed feet of females resulting from binding
in infancy, an utterly "inexpedient" crippling." For some groups,
beauty may reside in the distortion of head-shape, lips, or ear lobes,
fantastic tattooing or scarification. 2 Victorian women sought beauty in
painful compression of the waistline by means of corseting." Within
the single culture of our time and country, the aesthetics of some are
satisfied only by the orderliness and harmony of Bach; others must
•havie the romantic passion of Beethoven, Tschaikovsky, or Brahms. An-
other audience will find ultimate satisfaction only in the strange atonal-
ity, rhythms, monotones, and silences of Schoenberg or Cage. Painting
genres as diverse as stone age drawings of cave dwellers, Renaissance
"realism," Impressionist "color-songs," Post-Impressionist abstractions,
and modern minimalists are all perceived as beautiful by different seg-
ments of the art audience.
Despite these difficulties, I dare say none would advocate the ex-
pulsion of the concept of beauty from our language and thought. That
concept expresses an abiding aspiration for a quality that transcends
utility or expediency. It is a quality that evokes in the appropriate au-
dience a recognition of rightness, of fittingness according to a complex
Cf J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 248 (1971) (arguing that hereditary slav-
ery or serfdom cannot be justified "by citing natural or historical limitations").
'0 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 980 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dis-
senting from the 6-3 decision that good faith reliance by a police officer on a magis-
trate's warrant averts the exclusionary rule, even though the warrant was invalid).
1 See B. RUDOFSKY, THE UNFASHIONABLE HUMAN BODY 117-19 (1971).
See id. at 97-98.
13 See id. at 101-08.
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of psychological, historical, and political background shared by that au-
dience. It will be observed how close that idea of "rightness" is to the
idea of justice in law. Indeed, the aesthetic reaction to great art may be
a wondering recognition that it is "just right." One is reminded of the
usage of the term "just" to mean suitable or fitting." Keats was at-
tuned to this relationship between beauty and justice when he wrote
"Beauty is truth, truth beauty,"115 although he was obviously aware
that fiction is not history and that poetry is not a catalogue of natural
objects. The oft-heard reference to "poetic justice" is a similar equation
of aesthetic merit and legal legitimacy. Aristotle struck the same note
when he equated justice with proportionateness." A latter-day juris-
prudent, Ronald Dworkin, speaks of "creative interpretation" as apply-
ing alike to the interpretation of literature and law. 7
One difficulty with importing the concept of beauty into the legal
and political field is that choices regarding the dispensation of justice
cannot be left to individual taste. Doing justice is the central task of
government; the system is imposed on different classes of persons who
may have radically opposed aesthetics of justice. There is not much
question about whose aesthetic will governs under tyranny or oligopoly.
But in a democratic regime, the official art of dispensing justice is a
product of legislative or constitutional compromise between contending
interest groups. Once the interest groups have made their trade-offs and
bargained to a settlement, what room is there to argue that justice is
anything other than conformity to law so created?
Fortunately, several substantial possibilities remain for applying
the criterion of beauty in appraising the justice of statutes and other
positive law. Legislatures cannot anticipate all the novel situations that
14 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981) defines "just"
as "conforming to some standard of correctness: CORRECT, PROPER, FITTING." Id. at
1228. Compare this definition to the usage of "justify" in the printing trade to mean
"to make level and square ... to set and fit the measure of space closely ... so that
all full lines are of equal length and flush right and left." Id.
15 J. KEATS, Ode on a Grecian Urn, 1. 49, in THE POEMS OF JOHN KEATS 372,
373 1.49 (J. Stillinger ed. 1978). Cf H. THOREAU, Slavery in Massachusetts, in 2
THOREAU'S COMPLETE WORKS 388, 404 (1929) ("Justice is sweet and musical; but
injustice is harsh and discordant.").
1" ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 141-42 (D. Rees ed. 1951) ("[T]he
just is ... a term in a proportion, and moreover in a four term proportion.. . . What
is just ... implies at least four terms: . . . the two parties, and the shares which they
ought to have.").
17 R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 49-62, 228-275 (1986); see also B. CARDOZO,
THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 88-91 (1924) (stating that justice is "consistent with sym-
metry and order" and that it has "a kindred phenomenon in literature" since it is a
creative process); Grodin, Justice Tobriner: Portrait of the Judge as an Artist, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 7, 17-18 (1977) (arguing that the appreciation of wisdom, like art, may
be an acquired habit that cannot be described analytically).
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will arise. Statutory terms have an unavoidable penumbra of ambiguity
and change their meaning in ordinary usage as years pass."8 The origi-
nal interest group bargain gradually becomes obsolete as new power
blocks form. There will be a search for "original intent" or for "what
the Framers would have intended had they thought about it."' 9 In all
such interpretation and reinterpretation, current ideas of the good, the
fitting, and the just should and will be expressed.2"
Constitutional provisions, even more than statutory enactments, re-
quire the concept of justice for respectworthy interpretation. As in stat-
utes, the terms employed in old formulae for mediating conflicting in-
terests change their meaning over decades and centuries. There is thus
opportunity for justices to recast the balance in the light of both current
fitness and permanent values exemplified by specific constitutional pro-
visions. The U.S. Senate's recent rejection of the nomination of Robert
Bork to the Supreme Court2' represented, among other things, a repu-
diation of rigid original intent jurisprudence.
The Constitution itself rescues aesthetic justice from the reproach
of being a completely subjective criterion. It identifies certain political
values as superior or supreme, ordinarily invulnerable to competing
claims of expediency or the public good. Such are the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and religion, of public trial and assis-
tance of counsel, and of due process and equal protection of the laws.
Such also is the constitutional immunity from unreasonable search and
-compulsory self-incrimination, from which has grown a modern con-
cept of a constitutionally protected realm of privacy and individual au-
tonomy.22 Through the identification of these and other fundamental
values beyond the reach of legislatures, the Framers created a hierarchy
of values and saved beauty from condemnation as a totally subjective
criterion of justice.
There is a school of jurisprudence, however, that would reject not
merely beauty, but justice itself, as a criterion of decisionmaking and
lawmaking. Members of this school, known as "positivists,"2 would
18 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 350-353.
19 See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921). Cf R.
DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 352 (questioning the propriety of interpreting a statute by
relying in part upon how the original authors would have provided for a circumstance
for which they did not provide).
20 Cf R. DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 55 (rejecting original intent as the criterion
of interpretation, in favor of a conception of interpretation as an ongoing dialogue be-
tween current judges and authoritative texts).
21 Walsh & Marcus, Bork Rejected for High Court, Wash. Post, October 24,
1987, at 1, col. 1.
22 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITtrnONAL LAW 886-890, 893 (1978).
23 See generally E. POLLAK, JURISPRUDENCE 521-633 (1979) (explaining the
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find both concepts repellently subjective. So great a man as Justice Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes said, perhaps in jesting response to Judge
Learned Hand's admonition to "do Justice": "Young feller, that is not
my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules."24 One can
imagine how horrified the positivists would have been by a proposal
not only giving the impalpable idea of justice a larger role in teaching
and administering law, but making beauty an ingredient of justice!
In debates over the insanity defense before the American Law In-
stitute, I myself have opposed making justice the explicit standard for
judging the criminal responsibility of the mentally ill. My co-Reporter
for the Model Penal Code, Professor Herbert Wechsler, daunted by the
difficulty of specifying the degree and kind of mental illness that should
insulate a defendant from criminal liability, proposed a rule of nonre-
sponsibility if the defendant's capacity was "so substantially impaired
that he cannot justly be held responsible."2 I argued that putting the
matter thus to juries would not provide the requisite guidance to pro-
duce consistent results. Untrained jurors would be likely to be influ-
enced unduly by the atrocity of the crime in deciding whether it was
just to convict even a severely disturbed actor. Accordingly, my pre-
ferred alternative would have exculpated where "the prospect of convic-
tion and punishment cannot constitute a significant restraining influ-
ence upon [the actor]."2" Both alternatives were eventually rejected in
favor of the main proposal that exculpates for substantial incapacity of
the actor "either to appreciate the criminality . . . of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law."
'27
Regardless of whether justice is an appropriate issue to pose to an
unguided jury, it is a workable criterion for application by professional
judges in reaching plausible and consistent decisions within the range
permitted by the language of statutes or controlling precedents. The
constraint of justice as a control of choice within that range is derived
from the fundamental structure and highest aspirations of society. That
structure and those aspirations need not be explicit in a written consti-
tution. The constitution itself may require interpretation that refers
back to fundamental structure and highest aspirations.
positivists' approach to legal interpretation and offering examples of its application in
American law).
24 The incident is reported in R. HENSON, THE LAW OF SALES ix (1985), on the
basis of a personal letter from Judge Hand.
22 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (alternate formulation (1)(a)) (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955).
26 Id. (alternate formulation (1)(b)).
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (proposed Official Draft 1962).
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II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION OF JUSTICE
A. Justice and Legal Education
What difference would it make in the training of lawyers to focus
on the goal of justice? An immediate answer to that question lies in the
limited time available for the training of lawyers. Greater attention
cannot be given to one aspect of that training without reducing atten-
tion being given to other aspects. The most notable feature of current
legal education that would be deflated at the expense of increased con-
centration upon justice would be economics. More generally, law teach-
ers would have to be more cautious in promoting the Benthamite notion
that good law is that which is good for the community.28
To my consternation, I find myself here confronting not only Ben-
tham but also Justice Louis Brandeis, the personification of liberalism.
The so-called "Brandeis brief" amasses economic and social data to
prove that a statute is constitutional because it rests on a plausible
judgment by the legislature or that a precedent should be abandoned
because it cuts against current views of public policy.29 Maybe so. Re-
sults reached by that sort of analysis may coincidentally be just. In any
event, the analysis may usefully expose the superstitious premises of
earlier decisions. If the Brandeis analysis means only that circum-
stances alter cases and that judgment should be exercised in the light of
.full information about facts, no one could disagree. But failure to reach
beyond statistical and economic data may, as often as not, frustrate
justice.
Facts do not select themselves; they -are selected by advocates and
judges to support positions. Even in the physical sciences, there have
been scandalous cases where experimental data have been doctored by
their proponents to support conclusions." Fact selection to support a
previously adopted thesis may even be unconscious." Stephen Jay
28 See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 158 (1970) (1789) ("The general object which all laws have, or ought to
have, in common, is to augment the total happiness of the community . . ").
29 See, e.g., Brief for the Defendant in Error at 18-84, Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), reprinted in 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63, 83-149
(P. Kurland & G. Caspar ed. 1975); see also Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segrega-
tion Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 628 n.15 (discussing the purpose of the
"Brandeis brief").
SO See, e.g., S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 235-39 (1981) (discussing Sir
Cyril Burt's fabrication of evidence to support the hypothesis of hereditary
intelligence).
S See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111-35, 192-98
(2d ed., enlarged 1970).
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Gould described the process by which a respected scientist purported to
establish the inferiority of black intelligence on the basis of statistics of
head measurements: "His facts were reliable . . . but they were gath-
ered selectively and then manipulated unconsciously in the service of
prior conclusions. By this route, the conclusions achieved not only the
blessing of science, but the prestige of numbers. . . . [The episode ex-,
emplifies] advocacy masquerading as objectivity." 2 An experimenter
can easily and in good faith attribute "anomalous" results of a particu-
lar set of measurements to defects in the techniques employed in that
portion of the experiment. The temptation to do that is manifestly great
when the experimenter envisions herself as the beneficent discoverer of
a new remedy for a malignant physical or social disease.
This manipulability exposes one of the great weaknesses of reli-
ance upon sociological data to prove the justice of a decision. Social
scientists, advocates of academic theories, may shape factual arguments
in much the same way that lawyers, advocates of legal positions, pre-
sent an argument to a court. Greater awareness of this manipulability
of the "facts" of social science would push both teachers and students of
law toward a useful skepticism regarding the flood of economic, social,
historical, and psychological data with which courts, legislatures, and
lawyers are constantly inundated. In the classroom, one would hear
more often the spontaneous question: "But is this result just?" In the
post-Brandeis brief, the same question would be addressed in a system-
atic way, not merely as a rhetorical invocation. What makes a result
"just"-reasonable expectations? balance of hardship? original intent
of the legislators? impact on the community of a rule-generalization of
the result? consistency of treatment of like cases?
B. Justice and Constitutional Law
Should blacks be segregated in schools and other public institu-
tions? The answer to such questions can be found either in expediency
or in principle, the principle of justice. In order to reject the separate
but equal doctrine, the Supreme Court thought it appropriate in Brown
v. Board of Education3 3 to rely on sociological evidence demonstrating
that separate was not equal and that the education of both blacks and
whites was impaired by ethnic isolation. 4 But the statistics of that
demonstration were vulnerable, and expert opinion could readily be
2 S. GOULD, supra note 30, at 85 (describing the work of Paul Broca in the field
of cranial capacity).
s3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
U, See id. at 494.
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marshalled to show that the psychic wounds of intraclassroom ethnic
rivalry and tension could also be debilitating and countereducational.
Herbert Hovenkamp has brilliantly demonstrated that Brown, gratify-
ing as that decision was, had no greater claim to being scientific than
Plessy v. Ferguson,35 the "separate-but-equal" decision that Brown
overruled. 6
Consider how the Supreme Court would respond if a state chose
to segregate for the avowed purpose of giving the segregated group a
superior education. Suppose that the state attempted to carry out its
purpose by providing better facilities and more and better teachers in
order to compensate for past discrimination and to bring the segregated
group more rapidly into the mainstream of American culture. A Su-
preme Court driven by notions of good policy and benign purpose
might well sustain such a program. A Supreme Court attuned to the
ideal of justice would be more likely to condemn a policy of "separate
but superior," however benign.
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners37 is for me the
epitome of an unaesthetic constitutional injustice based on implausible
expediency. The Supreme Court there affirmed, by a five to four vote,
the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that restricted river boat pi-
loting to members of the families of previously licensed pilots. Justice
Black, writing for the majority, opined that this "economic" regulation
could survive constitutional attack based on the equal protection clause
so long as there was a rational basis for the legislative action. 8 He
found that basis in the
useful function a closely knit pilotage system may serve.
Thus the advantages of early experience under friendly su-
pervision in the locality of the pilot's training, the benefits to
morale and esprit de corps which family and neighborly tra-
dition might contribute, the close association in which pilots
must work and live in their pilot communities and on the
water, and the discipline and regulation which is imposed to
35 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
36 See Hovenkamp, supra note 29 at 665-68. For an extensive bibliography re-
garding the use of social science in Brown, see D. KIRP & M. YUDOFF, EDUCATIONAL
POLICY AND THE LAW 428-30 (1982); see also Yudoff, School Desegregation: Legal
Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn, 1978, at 57, 109 ("Social scientists, of course, are
quite capable of rendering such interpretive judgments, and these may well influence
the judicial process. But they should not parade in the garb or language of the empiri-
cism of the physical sciences.").
-1 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
38 See id. at 564.
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assure the State competent pilot service after appointment,
might have prompted the legislature to permit Louisiana pi-
lot officers to select those with whom they would serve. 9
In a remarkable footnote, Justice Black observed without irony the ar-
gument that "the pilots themselves were the first to see the disadvan-
tages of the free or competitive system and to take steps toward the
organization of associations. These associations soon developed into
strong working combinations that eliminated competition and placed on
a amicable basis matters that formerly produced much sharp rivalry."40
In other words, the legislative arrangement by which a caste monopo-
lized a profession for its own families was sustained partly on the basis
of that caste's satisfaction with the "amicable" arrangement.4
It remained for Justice Rutledge, in dissent, to reject efficiency as
a ground for excluding perfectly qualified nonconsanguineous pilots
from the practice of their calling:
It is not enough. . . that a familial system may have a
tendency or, as the Court puts it, a direct relationship to the
end of securing an efficient pilotage system ...
Conceivably the familial system would be the most ef-
fective possible scheme for training many kinds of artisans or
public servants, sheerly from the viewpoint of securing the
highest degree of skill and competence. Indeed, something
very worth while largely disappeared from our national life
when the once prevalent familial system of conducting man-
ufacturing and mercantile enterprises went out and was re-
placed by the highly impersonal corporate system for doing
business.
But that loss is not one to be repaired under our scheme
by legislation framed or administered to perpetuate family
monopolies of either private occupations or branches of the
public service. It is precisely because the [fourteenth]
Amendment forbids enclosing those areas by legislative lines
drawn on the basis of race, color, creed and the like, that, in
cases like this, the possibly most efficient method of securing
the highest development of skills cannot be established by
SI Id. at 563.
Id. at 561 n.22 (quoting DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PILOTAGE IN THE
UNITED STATEs 29 (1917)).
41 Cf New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 294 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (offering support for the monopolistic Ice Act, Brandeis stated that "the ice
industry . . acquiesced in and accepted the Act and the status which it creates"). See
infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
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law.42
I invite you as lawyers and parents of law-aspiring sons and
daughters to consider the attractiveness from a public policy perspective
of the proposition that admission to the bar should be restricted to rela-
tives of lawyers, since they would have been immersed from childhood
in the traditions of justice, the ways of the wicked world, and the intri-
cacies of courts, administrative agencies, and the internal revenue laws.
Even our present conservative Supreme Court would give short shrift to
such putative public gain to be achieved by a caste system.43
Mr. Justice Black's great mistake in the Kotch case had its ideo-
logical roots in the famous Brandeis dissent in New State Ice v. Lieb-
mann. 4 The Oklahoma legislature had passed a law forbidding anyone
to engage in the manufacture or sale of ice without special permission
of the state. Permission could be obtained only by proving that existing
facilities for production or sale of ice were inadequate. Even in such a
situation the existing operators would be given a priority opportunity to
supply any deficiency. Although the statute was passed to correct an
alleged oversupply of ice in Oklahoma, resulting in so-called destructive
competition, no effort was made to either eliminate any of the many
suppliers or to restrict expansion of operations by those who were in
business at the time the statute was passed. Plaintiff, New State Ice
Company, was an established operator at the time the statute was en-
acted and accordingly was issued a certificate of privilege to engage and
expand without proof that its facilities were needed by the public.
Liebmann, the defendant, proposed to enter the ice business in
Oklahoma City, attracted, undoubtedly, by the high prices obtainable
from customers as a result of restriction of competition by the statute.
Regarding the statute as both a constitutionally invalid restraint of his
freedom to engage in a common calling and an arbitrary discrimination
in favor of those who were already established in the ice business, Lieb-
mann did not apply for a state certificate, nor did he undertake the
hopeless task of persuading an industry-dominated state agency that his
new facilities were required in the public interest. He simply started
construction and operation. New State Ice Company, understandably
regarding its state-protected franchise as property, entitled to protection
against unauthorized rivalry, sued to enjoin Liebmann.
42 Kotch, 330 U.S. at 565-66 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
41 Cf. Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1985) (rejecting arguments
that New Hampshire's residence requirement for lawyers should be upheld because
residents are more familiar with local rules, more surely available for court proceed-
ings, and more likely to render pro bono services).
44 285 U.S. at 280-311.
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The majority opinion of the Supreme Court, written by conserva-
tive Justice Sutherland, rather summarily invalidated the Oklahoma
statute on the ground that it arbitrarily restricted freedom to engage in
an "ordinary occupation."" 5 The result seems right to me because the
statute unjustly discriminated in favor of the "ins" against the "outs"
upon the flimsiest pretense of public welfare. It is not, however, an easy
case. There is much to be said, as Brandeis did in dissent,46 for broad,
though not unlimited, deference by judges to legislators in matters of
economic legislation. There is even more to be said on grounds of feder-
alism for the United States Supreme Court to proceed with extreme
caution when invited to intervene against state economic regulation.
Moreover, legislative action must not be paralyzed by the fact that al-
most all statutory innovation affects some groups in the community
more severely than others.
However, it was common ground between Sutherland and Bran-
deis that the Supreme Court did have the power and responsibility to
intervene if the state action was arbitrary or capricious. 4 My point
here is that Brandeis chose to apply the criterion of arbitrariness as if it
were solely a question of expediency, as if anything that an Oklahoma
legislature might have accepted as economic justification for the Ice Act
would save the statute regardless of the disparity in treatment of like-
situated individuals. The result of that extraordinary tolerance for ex-
pediency was to introduce into Brandeis's opinion a number of ques-
tionable features, as follows:
(i) Brandeis accepted the ice industry's manifestly ab-
surd argument that the legislation was justified by the neces-
sity to curb "natural monopoly" in the ice business. 48 . He
noted that the industry suffered from excessive competition,
but failed to grasp that excessive competition is hardly a
description of "monopoly." Even if it could be described as
such, it is utterly illogical to seek to cure monopoly by re-
stricting competition; 49
(ii) Brandeis, though he cited the ice industry trade
publication's propaganda favoring restriction of entry,5" did
not draw the obvious inference that the legislation was pro-
45 Id. at 279-80.
41 Id. at 285, 291 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
41 See id. at 278, 279; id. at 284-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
48 See id. at 293-95, 304 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (justifying the Ice Act as neces-
sary to control monopoly resulting from destructive competition).
41 See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 19-21, 29 (1977)
(discussing maintenance of competition as the general objective of antitrust laws).50 See New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 292-93.
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industry and anticonsumer, that its purpose was to raise
prices and profits, not to recapture profits from an alleged
monopoly; and (iii) Brandeis ignored the fact that competi-
tion and regulation are alternative forms of controlling trade,
and that competition is the more severe discipline.
Of course the ice industry opted for the gentler controls of regulation,
just as the motor carrier industry did and continues to do.
Probably, Brandeis knew perfectly well what he was doing-not
opposing monopoly, but supporting a primitive brand of supply-side
economics under which established business would be protected and
made profitable so that banks would not fail, employment would be
stabilized, tax revenues would grow, and deficits would evaporate. As
the opinion shows, he was responding to the national economic crisis of
the times, desperate for experimental solutions, hospitable to arguments
of expediency, and correspondingly tolerant of individual injustices.51
One final point made by Justice Brandeis illustrates the fantastic
extremes to which expediency as a test of justice can be pushed. Bran-
deis envisioned the use of noncompetitive profits in Oklahoma City to
subsidize ice supply in remote rural areas, a kindness to mislocated
farmers.52 Dairy farms dependent on refrigeration would, with this
subsidy, no longer be economically required to cluster near the market
cities but could disperse into regions otherwise unfavorable to milk pro-
duction. On this theory, milk consumers in Oklahoma City would pay
more for milk in order to increase supplies from inefficiently located
sources. Dairy farmers closer to Oklahoma City would lose the natural
advantage of proximity to the market, and would be required to share
their business with artificially advantaged competitors. The aggregate
transport cost, and consequently the aggregate price, of milk would
then increase.
According to economic theory, the quantity of milk consumed
would decline with increased costs and prices. The scheme as imagina-
tively rationalized by Brandeis included no provision setting limits on
the mislocation of dairy farmers, but one is driven to the conclusion
-that inappropriate relocation of dairying, by subsidies in electric power
and telephone rates, as well as ice rates, would have to be checked by
similar bureaucratic control of farming.
The Brandeis dissent thus demonstrates the extent to which dubi-
ous expedience can obscure obvious injustice. The opinion does not re-
51 See id. at 307 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing "unbridled competition" as
a contributing factor to depression).
52 See id. at 289 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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flect the injustice of depriving Oklahoma mothers and children of milk
in order to subsidize errant or unfortunate farmers nor did it address
the injustice of bankrupting a marginal close-in dairy farmer in order
to maintain artificially a marginal remote rival or the injustice of pro-
tecting old entrepreneurs who, like New State Ice, made their original
investment without being promised immunity from competition against
new entrepreneurs like Liebmann.
5 3
Two generations of experience with restrictionist solutions to in-
dustry problems have now brought us to the age of deregulation, in
which we are dismantling barriers against entry into transportation,
communications, and other public utility fields. This may be regarded
as either a refutation of the public policy premises of Brandeis' opinion
in New State Ice or as a development warranted by changing conditions
and new perceptions of public policy. Either way, there is notice here
of the contingent and problematical character of public policy judg-
ments that manifestly prejudice some entrepreneurs and consumers.
C. Justice and Criminal Law
Criminal law has multiple and contradictory goals, some of them
manifestly expedient, others emphasizing justice in the sense of individ-
ual culpability or "just deserts." '54 To the extent that the posited goals
are deterrence, maintenance of public order, and protection of private
security, criminal law tends to elevate public policy over justice to an
individual defendant. Perceived needs for effective enforcement under-
mine normal safeguards against unfairness to the individual. For exam-
ple, defendants may be convicted without proof of fault as in "strict
liability" regulatory offenses.55 Conviction for felonious drug peddling
may be authorized where the seller, possibly a pharmacist handling a
packaged patent remedy, is neither aware nor reckless of the presence
of forbidden quantities of the dangerous substance.56 Reasonable good
53 I recognize, of course, that internal cross-subsidies are pervasive, acceptable,
and to a degree inevitable in public business whether carried on directly by the state, as
in education, road building, health, or national defense, or indirectly through public
utility companies. The controlling consideration in such cases, however, is that large
scale "externalities" or "natural monopoly" make market solutions impracticable.
Moreover, such public businesses are not conducted for profit or have their profits
limited by law.
54 See, e.g., S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 181-248 (1983) (discussing justifications for punishment).
55 See Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-63 (1952) (tracing evolution
of strict criminal liability for "public welfare offenses" and approving the existence of
some such category while refusing to expand it to include common law crimes).
58 See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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faith mistakes of fact or law will not necessarily exonerate.57 Insanity
may not exculpate even if it negatives volition, the power to make the
choice to conform to the law."8
Sometimes the perceived public policy goal that overrides consider-
ations of justice to the individual is "education" or celebration of com-
mon ideals by a dramatic ritual of condemnation and punishment. Re-
gina v. Machekequonabe5 9 provides an example. Machekequonabe, an
indigene of Northern Canada, killed a man in the course of guard duty
to which he and others had been posted by their community to ward off
attacks by deadly spirits in human form. He was convicted of man-
slaughter by the Canadian government, despite the fact that the killing
was manifestly justified by the commonly held beliefs of his isolated
society. The conviction can be rationalized only as a substitute for
peaceful conversion of a conquered group to the dominant culture.
Likewise, Regina v. Dudley and Stephens,6" the famous shipwreck
cannibalism case, must be seen as a ritual condemnation of killing even
under the most extenuating circumstances since the judges in effect re-
nounced utilitarian and retributive goals by acknowledging that the
standard of behavior embodied in the conviction was one they might
themselves have been unable to follow. 61 Ultimately, however, the sen-
tence was commuted by the Crown, reflecting a concession to the de-
mands of justice.6 2
A peculiar aspect of balancing expediency and justice in criminal
law is that it may at times be necessary to compromise justice in the
individual case for the sake of enhancing justice in future cases involv-
57 See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating
that Watergate "foot soldiers" who unlawfully searched psychiatrist's files for informa-
tion were not necessarily excused by reasonable, good-faith reliance on authorization by
White House staffer); People v. Olsen, 36 Cal. 3d 638, 642-49, 685 P.2d 52, 57-59,
205 Cal. Rptr. 492, 494-99 (1984) (en banc) (holding that reasonable, good-faith mis-
take of fact as to age of victim provides no defense to a charge of lewd and lascivious
conduct with a child under 14); Regina v. Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 173-77
(1875) (Bramwell, J.) (dismissing mistake of fact defense to charge of taking unmarried
girl under 16 out of father's possession), reprinted in S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER &
M. PAULSEN, supra note 54, at 283-86.
58 See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir.) (narrowing
insanity defense to cases in which defendant was unable to appreciate wrongfulness of
the criminal act and excluding evidence of addiction from trial for narcotics offenses),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 930 (1984).
11 28 O.R. 309 (Ont. Div'l Ct. 1897).
60 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
1 Id. at 288. Cf. Regina v. Howe, 2 W.L.R. 568 (H.L. 1987) (following Dudley
and Stephens in rejecting the defense of duress in murder cases).
62 See S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, supra note 54, at 186. Like-
wise, the jury recommended mercy in the Machekequonabe case. See Machekequonabe,
28 O.R. at 310.
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ing others. One sophisticated criminologist puts it in terms of the right-
ness of sometimes doing an injustice. 63 I reject this oxymoron and pre-
fer to recognize as just any decision that minimizes injustice after
balancing immediate hardships against future hardships. Often the Bill
of Rights makes it clear how such a balance is to be struck. In guaran-
teeing a jury trial, the right to counsel, freedom from compulsory self-
incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure, and due process
generally, the Founders knew they were trading an occasional unjust
acquittal against intolerable governmental tyranny. They opted dramat-
ically to pay the social cost for greater individual security from unjust
official intrusion.
An example of the trade-off is the so-called exclusionary rule bar-
ring admission of illegally obtained evidence, however conclusively it
might establish guilt.6 4 The rule may lead to an acquittal that is unjust
in that the outcome does not correspond to the defendant's culpability.
The exclusionary rule is, however, defensible on the ground that it is
the only effective method to ensure that police follow law enforcement
standards prescribed by society."5 Such standards are necessary if we
are to minimize baseless intrusions (involving the innocent much more
often than the guilty) into the privacy of individuals. Unwarranted in-
trusions are unjust-not all justice is administered by courts-and we
may be unable to avoid the dilemma of accepting an occasional unjust
acquittal to prevent many more unjust official intrusions. Note that the
exclusionary rule would not be acceptable if alternative means were
available to vindicate proper standards of police behavior. 6
A greater concern for justice in criminal law need not lead to com-
plete abandonment of prosecution-favoring expedients like strict liabil-
ity for regulatory offenses, limiting defenses based on mistake, or nar-
rowing the scope of the insanity plea. Rather, legislatures and courts
would be stimulated to refine the relevant bodies of law in order to
preserve opportunities for the innocent transgressor to avoid unjust con-
viction. The expedient administrative and enforcement gains that are at
" See Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 271 (1987).
84 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (expanding doctrine that evidence
obtained by unconstitutional search or seizure is inadmissible in federal criminal trials
to include state trials).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (noting that the
primary purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter future unlawful police conduct
and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures").
68 For an analysis of the improbability of effective alternative controls in the con-
text of American political life, see Schwartz, Complaints Against the Police: Experience
of the Community Rights Division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, 118
U. PA. L. REV. 1023 (1970).
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stake need not be entirely disregarded. It may be possible to preserve
these gains while making a justice-serving partial reallocation of the
burden of proof. Thus, it might be provided that a defendant can defeat
prosecution for a strict liability offense by presenting convincing proof
that it was committed under circumstances involving none of the dan-
gers at which the law was directed. Similarly, the burden of proving
exculpating insanity can be placed on the defendant.17 Of course, any
shift away from requiring the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt is itself a compromise of traditional notions of jus-
tice.6 However, as in the case of the exclusionary rule, this concession
would be made as the necessary trade-off for avoiding more injustice in
imposing criminal conviction and punishment on individuals without
fault.
There are other ways as well to ameliorate strict liability law in
the interest of justice. Offenses could be legislatively graded to preclude
imprisonment for a first offense not involving recklessness with regard
to the danger targeted by the statute. Substantial sentences could be
restricted by law to cases of recidivists manifesting willful defiance of
legislative or administrative controls.69 Thus, substantial concentration
on justice need not derail the criminal law goals of maintenance of pub-
lic order and protection of society. Individual justice must not be forgot-
ten. The expediency of simple convictions and efficient regulation of
society cannot override considerations of justice in the field of criminal
law.
D. Expediency and Antitrust Law
No field of law has been more beset by fictions of expediency than
antitrust law. Almost four centuries ago, Parliament enacted the pio-
87 This has, in fact, already been done. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,
799 (1952) (Oregon rule placing burden of proving the insanity defense upon the de-
fendant did not violate generally accepted notions of "justice"); Rivera v. State, 351
A.2d 561, 563 (Del.) (upholding Delaware statute requiring defendant raising an in-
sanity defense to prove mental illness by a preponderance of the evidence), appeal dis-
missed, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). Cf Martin v. Ohio, 107 S. Ct. 1098, 1102 (1987) (Ohio
rule placing the burden of proving self-defense upon the defendant did not violate due
process); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1977) (upholding New York's
shifting to defendant burden of proof of the expanded provocation defense of extreme
emotional disturbance).
e' The requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is
premised on our society's traditional determination that it is "far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970); see also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 8
(1972).
69 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 1006 (1970).
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neer Statute of Monopolies,"0 referring to the "untrue pretences of pub-
lick good" by which court favorites had sought to justify monopoly
franchises.71 These untrue pretenses have recurred constantly in judi-
cial decisions on the issue of what sort of restraints of trade should be
regarded as reasonable. A famous eighteenth-century decision, Mitchel
v. Reynolds,72 upheld as reasonable a covenant by the seller of a
bakeshop that he would not reenter the business in competition with
the buyer. The court thought that such an agreement ought to be en-
forced because it might be "useful and beneficial, as to prevent a town
from being overstocked," or because it might enable an "old man" to
get more money for his shop upon his retirement and so "procure to
himself a livelihood, which he might probably have lost."7 '3 The ficti-
tious or incommensurable character of the alleged public good is ex-
posed, however, in the following analysis:
How will consumers of bread benefit by keeping the old
baker from reengaging in trade? Can they be hurt by "over-
stocking"? What evidence of overstocking is there other than
the contract itself? Reynolds must have been confident that
the parish had room for two bakers, or at least that the
townspeople would prefer his baking to Mitchel's. Assuming
that too much confection can be harmful, is it wise to leave
the matter up to two bargaining bakers, or should the town
council make a determination as to how much is too much?
And should the matter then be left open for reconsideration
in case Mitchel proves inadequate? Should the town forearm
itself against the putative evil of "overstocking," by refusing
to let any new bakery be established unless the city authori-
ties are satisfied that public convenience or necessity will be
served?
Is the decision justifiable as a kindness to old bakers, a
primitive form of social security and old age insurance? It is
plainly not limited to the elderly or needy. The ailing old
man is least likely to reengage in business. It is the successful
entrepreneur who has built up "good will" who can get a
premium for his promise not to reengage in business and
7 The Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac., ch. 3, condensed in L. SCHWARTZ,
J. FLYNN & H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: ANTI-
TRUST 1-2 (6th ed. 1983).
71 See L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN & H. FIRST, supra note 70 at 2 (noting that the
Statute's target was monopolies granted by the sovereign).
72 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
s Id. at 350.
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against whom vendees will need to invoke judicial sanctions.
Besides, should a social security program be inaugurated at
the expense of the citizenry for the benefit of retiring busi-
nessmen, the group most likely to have accumulated private
savings?
74
Another notorious instance of judicial self-delusion or pretense of
public good as justifying private arrangements to restrict competition is
supplied by Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition
Co.7 15 That decision enforced against the seller of an arms business a
covenant that he would not compete with the buying company any-
where in the world. In a free-wheeling undertaking to vindicate British
public policy in international affairs, defense, and colonialism, the court
decided not "to encourage unfettered competition in the sale of arms of
precision to tribes who may become [Britain's] antagonists in war-
fare."7 6 The Nordenfelt opinion simply ignored the fact that the al-
leged British imperial policy was, and would continue to be, entirely at
the discretion of the private traders. Had they chosen to omit the an-
ticompetitive covenant from their deal, or if they had chosen subse-
quently to release the seller from his covenant, the spurious public pol-
icy would have evaporated into thin air. Moreover, the court, in
excluding Nordenfelt from competing in domestic British arms manu-
facturing, foreclosed potential national defense gains from reduced cost
and improved quality of British armament under competitive
conditions.
77
The Reagan Administration has carried to absurd lengths the
identification of expediency with justice in antitrust cases. In this field,
expediency goes by the name of efficiency, and the Department of Jus-
tice and the courts are supposed to discriminate between mergers that
promote efficiency and mergers that do not.78 The most meretricious
efficiency claims are taken seriously, as when General Motors and
Toyota were authorized to enter into a joint venture to produce small
cars in California on the ground that, despite the anticompetitive fea-
tures of the enterprise, it was the only way that the American indus-
trial colossus could learn to emulate Japanese wizardry in producing
74 L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN & H. FIRST, supra note 70, at 3.
75 1894 App. Gas. 535 (H.L.).
76 Nordenfelt, 1894 App. Gas. at 554 (opinion of Lord Watson).
7' This analysis is taken from L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN AND H. FIRST, supra
note 70, at 4-5. See also Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
64, 71-72 (1873).
78 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 1-2, 27
(1982).
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small automobiles.7 9 Never mind that General Motors is already inti-
mately associated with those mysteriously successful teachers of auto-
mobile production in Japan, Korea, and elsewhere. Never mind the
stupendous resources that General Motors deploys for internal develop-
ment, for the purchase of foreign technology and know-how, and for
the hiring of foreign engineers.8 0 The school to which General Motors
is determined to go to improve its skills must be operated jointly by
teacher and pupil! It follows naturally that Ford Motor Corporation
would emulate General Motors in the desperate search for a Japanese
instructor; they too have proposed an intensified partnership with
Mazda, of which Ford is already part owner.81
Forecasting efficiency gains from industrial combinations is notori-
ously difficult, and the corporate scene is littered with moribund enter-
prises whose viability was vastly misjudged by would-be builders of
corporate empires.8 2 Moreover, enhanced efficiency from mergers'and
joint ventures would be pure serendipity when one considers the real
motives of corporate executives and investment bankers. Supposed syn-
ergies"3 have little to do with the formation of giant conglomerates. In-
stead, financial decisions are dominated by the potential for finders' fees
and bankers' commissions, by the prospects of "greenmail" or other ar-
bitrage profits,8 4 by the prospect of inflating earnings multiples of good,
7' See Ordover & Shapiro, The General Motors-Toyota Joint Venture: An Eco-
nomic Assessment, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1167, 1174 (1985). But see Note, A Defini-
tional Test for Joint Ventures, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1251, 1270-72 (1985) ("The ra-
tionale that no alternative [to the joint venture in California] was possible or desirable
is unconvincing.").
80 Cf. Ordover & Shapiro, supra note 79, at 1168-69 (the American auto industry
has recently adopted management, automation technology, and inventory innovations).
81 See Buss & Kanabayashi, Critics Fault Ford Plan to Produce Small Cars with
Mazda ofJapan, Wall St. J., June 23, 1986, at 1, col. 6. The article discusses the joint
venture's predicted effect on deteriorating U.S. competitiveness, specifically the atro-
phying of the American firm's engineering skills, and mentions that Ford risks re-
vealing more to Mazda than it will learn from Mazda.
82 See Why Oil Companies Are Now Shying from Diversification, San Francisco
Chron., Dec. 3, 1984, at 58, col. 1, reprinted in Schwartz, Diversification and Regu-
lated Industries-What's Next for the Telephone Holding Companies?, 7 COMM./
ENT. 195, 207 n.50 (1985). Consider also observations that the value of the acquiring
company's stock typicially declines following the acquisition. See D. COMMONS,
TENDER OFFER: THE SNEAK ATTACK IN CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 133 (1985) (citing
Louis, The Bottom Line on Ten Big Mergers, FORTUNE, May 3, 1982, at 84, 84-89).
83 See R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQuISITIONs 387-
445 (1986) (discussing the phenomenon of "synergy" that may occur when two corpo-
rations are combined, causing the predicted value of the combined corporation to exceed
the calculable value of the two individual corporations).
8 "Greenmail" refers to the repurchase of stock by a target company from a hos-
tile acquirer, often at a price greater than market value, resulting in profit to the ac-
quirer and the continued independence of the target. See D. COMMONS, supra note 82,
at 138. Arbitrageurs' acquisition of the target company's stock with a view to resale to
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small enterprises when absorbed into glamorous "Fortune 500" compa-
nies, by "golden parachutes" for apprehensive corporate officers,85 and
by irrational rivalries to be "the biggest.""6 Public policy arguments,
such as the promotion of American industrial efficiency and power in
international markets that results from merger-created conglomerates,
are reserved for regulatory commissions and courts, and are basically
afterthoughts of lawyers.
E. Justice and Tort Law
The field of torts provides excellent examples of the distortion of
justice when notions of expediency predominate in judgment. As men-
tioned in the opening paragraphs of this essay, a brilliant generation of
legal philosophers has sought to define good tort law as law that places
the risk of loss where it can best be borne or distributed and where the
risk-taker is in the best position to take measures to avert the danger."7
This notion of justice as equal to expediency requires only an economic
calculation to determine the outcome of all cases.The most famous and
plausible illustration of this rationalization of tort law is that of a
farmer who places an inflammable crop next to a spark-emitting steam
railroad line. The railroad is required to bear the loss of ensuing fires
not because it has done anything reprehensible, but because it can fac-
tor fire losses into the rates it charges shippers, thus spreading the risk
in small shares among many who can bear it more easily. 8 Moreover,
the acquirer not only offers an opportunity for profit to the arbitrageur on resale to
either target company or acquirer but also facilitates acquisition through concentration
of the supply of shares. See id., at 30-32 (noting that individual shareholders, unlike
the arbitrageurs who buy from them, may form attachments to management and
thereby impede the takeover).
85 The term "golden parachutes" refers to payments provided to corporate manag-
ers upon a change of control of the company. These payments, often equivalent to
several years' salary, serve as both a defensive tactic for target corporations and as
insurance against loss of income for corporate managers. See R. GILSON, supra note
83, at 670.
88 For discussions of the private or irrational motivations for corporate takeovers,
see D. COMMONS, supra note 82, at 25-34; Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corpo-
rate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Govern-
ance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1192-95, 1200-06, 1211-34 (1984); Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 101-02 nn. 2, 3, 7, 104, 119-24
(1979) (examining the "director's dilemma" in trying to safeguard both the short-term
interests of speculating shareholders and the long-term interests of other shareholders,
as well as the vitality of the firm and the national economy), criticized in Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 857-59 (1981). See generally R. GILSON, supra note
83, at 255-498 (reviewing contradictory theories and evidence of motivations for
acquisitions).
87 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
88 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 43-45, 164 (3d ed. 1986) (using
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as a matter of optimal risk management, if the railroad is in the best
position to take measures against spark emission, it should be given the
greatest incentive to do so by being held strictly responsible, whether or
not it is negligent. Such arguments are supported by the economic pro-
position that the total social cost of railroading, and hence the rates
charged, should reflect all losses that would not have occurred absent
the railroad operations. Overall efficiency is thus promoted, it is said,
because consumers' choices will favor least-cost alternatives.8"
The expediency issue is much complicated by the consideration
that farmers also have the ability to redistribute risks by buying fire
insurance, that fire insurance premiums would be factored into the cost
of crops (along with lowered costs of land near fire risks), and that
efficient use of agricultural land calls for pricing that reflects all costs.9"
Some clever economists will further muddy the controversy over expedi-
ency by pointing out that risk-sharing between railroads and farmers
can and will be governed by contracts between them so that ultimately
the most valuable activity will pay for relief from the risk.9 Other
clever economists will then raise the question of transaction costs, i.e.,
how expensive and efficient will the contracting process be?92 In sum,
regarding the preceding sketch of tort theory, it is apparent that shift-
ing and sometimes dubious ideas of public policy and pragmatic utility
dominate thinking in this field, virtually eliminating concern about
whether it is fair or just to make A compensate B for damage that B
has suffered.
This lack of concern for individual justice may be acceptable as
applied to risk-creating, risk-distributing collective enterprises such as
automobile manufacturers, airlines, or insurance companies. In such
contexts, indeed, issues of justice, as distinguished from expediency,
hardly arise. The basic question is unavoidably managerial: how should
economic activity be organized most efficiently? Only by dubious an-
thropomorphizing can one be unjust to a public corporation. Tort lia-
hypothetical derived from LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340
(1914).
89 Cf. id. at 43 (presenting the idea that parties will negotiate a transaction that
improves each party's position, regardless of the initial assignment of legal right).
90 See id. at 7, 62 (suggesting external costs that, economically, should be incorpo-
rated by the farmer).
91 See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A
Comment, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: READINGS IN THE THE-
ORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 204, 204-05 (H. Manne ed. 1975); Coase, supra note 5, at
4-6.
12 Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1442-47 (1974) (suggesting the various transactional and
human factors giving rise to transaction costs).
" The proposition in the text expresses my own dubiety about attributing per-
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bility of individuals is an altogether different matter. Consider the jus-
tice of a rule holding an individual landowner94 liable to a guest or
trespasser injured by a condition on the property that may be as un-
known to the owner as to the injured. The dramatic and pitiable char-
acter of the injury may arouse strong sympathy for the plaintiff. Expe-
diency might call for state-provided health and accident insurance that
would be available to all accident victims without distinction in favor of
those who by chance can embroil another solvent person as private in-
surer. Justice, however, would not allocate insurance liabilities so
arbitrarily.
The jurisprudence of torts can justify (find justice in) a verdict
that seeks to compensate an occasional unfortunate by postulating fault
on the part of the defendant. The reality, however, is that the fault, if
any, is often so marginal a failure to comply with the standard of "the
ordinary reasonable person" that the drastic penalty seems grossly dis-
proportionate to the misbehavior, i.e., an injustice. The motorist has
driven only a mile or two per hour faster than an arbitrarily prescribed
speed limit. The victim of the accident proves to be a prosperous young
professional whose remaining life will be highly appraised in a jury
verdict. The damages in that case will be vastly different from the dam-
ages assessed if the victim had been an aged derelict. This is a crude
(unbeautiful? unjust?) system of social security. It discriminates in
sonal rights to great collective entities, not that of the United States Supreme Court.
The Court has invalidated on first amendment grounds a public utility commission's
ban on promotional advertising by utility companies. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 570 (1980); see also Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (invalidating on first amend-
ment grounds state prohibition of billing inserts expressing the views of public utilities
on controversial issues); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767, 795 (1978)
(invalidating state statute that forbade any corporation from spending money to publi-
cize political views on issues not related to the corporation's business). One would have
thought a priori that it was well within the competence of a state, in a federal system
that tolerates so much diversity in state incorporation laws, to confine the special privi-
leges of incorporation to a range of specified commercial purposes, not including politi-
cal propaganda.
94 "Individual" includes, for present purposes, small-scale co-owners or co-occupi-
ers-partners, for example. "Landowner" includes occupants responsible for the state
of the premises. See Ursin, supra note 5, at 839-46 (discussing the trend toward apply-
ing a de facto strict liability standard to business landowners instead of the negligence
standard applied to individual landowners). Cf. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 4, at 297-
311 (discussing case law applying strict liability to "commercial" hazards).
The implications of the distinction here urged between liability of individuals and
liability of collectives such as corporations, insurance companies, and municipalities are
not explored in this essay. However, it would not be impossible to exonerate individuals
while imposing liability on their insurers. That might require recasting liability insur-
ance contracts so that they compensate the injured person rather than protecting the
insured against tort judgments. Such a liability scheme would accord with the philoso-
phy of compulsory auto insurance laws.
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favor of well-to-do individuals and classes who are quite capable of
buying their own disability insurance and who, if left to their own de-
vices, would obtain a better form of insurance than one contingent upon
both the solvency of a tortfeasor and proof of negligence.95
It is not a long step, and it is one that has already been taken in
some classes of tort,9 from liability based on tenuous fault to liability
without fault. This has the virtue of candor but completely exposes the
basis of the institution in expediency rather than in justice. Liability
without fault rests on a policy of strengthening the incentive of entre-
preneurs to prevent or insure against accidents and a policy of avoiding
prolonged and inconclusive inquiries into fault, often with capricious
results. The nexus between adjudication and justice becomes attenu-
ated, and the question arises whether the whole operation had not bet-
ter be shifted out of the courts and into an administrative agency. An
agency similar to a workers' compensation board could easily devise a
schedule of compensation for an eye, a limb, a disfigurement, or a life-
time of paralysis.17 If compensation for injury without fault is desira-
ble, it should not be confined to injuries growing out of employment.
The principle of social insurance should be applied equally to all who
sustain injuries, including those who accidentally injure themselves or
suffer injuries from strangers. 8
Paradoxically, some scholars who believe that the tort system is
inexpedient or unjust nevertheless recommend that judges adhere to it
and refine it and even exacerbate its follies. They postulate that either a
sufficiently comprehensive set of fictional fault and strict liability will
move the tort system incrementally towards a judicially formulated so-
cial insurance system, or the gradual exposure of the tenuous basis of
the existing tort system will compel legislatures to enact remedial legis-
11 I certainly do not mean to argue in favor of current legislative movements to set
caps on the amounts recoverable in medical malpractice and other classes of cases.
These initiatives have their own shortcomings.
98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-24A (1977).
97 See, e.g., 77 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 511-516 (Purdon 1987) (Injured em-
ployees receive a stated percentage of their wages for a specific bodily injury; for exam-
ple, an employee whose disability results from a permanent loss of a hand would re-
ceive 66- 2A% of wages for 335 weeks.).
11 See generally G. WHITE, supra note 4, at 146-153 (describing the evolution of
tort law from admonishment of blameworthy actors to compensation of the injured);
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 564-73 (1972)
(arguing that different paradigms of tort law are merely different standards for weigh-
ing individual interests against the "background risks" inherent in group living);
Hutchinson, Beyond No-Fault, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 766-71 (1985) (advocating so-
cietal assumption of health and welfare risks to individuals, to be achieved by greater
democratization); Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 592-
96 (1985) (criticizing tort law as a system for accident victim compensation).
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lation.99 This reasoning appears to embrace an extraordinary involve-
ment of activist judges in pursuing the long-range goal of legislatively
prescribed social insurance by means of provocative immediate deci-
sional injustices.
F. Justice and Professional Ethics
Greater emphasis on justice would transform the teaching and
practice of legal ethics and professional responsibility, especially in the
area of adversarial advocacy. The predominant view of the legal profes-
sion is that the lawyer's obligation of zeal for her client mandates the
assertion of every colorable claim or defense on the client's behalf.100
The lawyer, other than a prosecutor, appears to be relieved of any obli-
gation to provide the opponent with material evidence, except as com-
pelled, for example, by discovery rules.10 1 Virtually any tactical delay
or maneuver available under procedural rules is tolerated or admired.
The profession and the public honor effective play-acting before juries,
including impassioned pleas for propositions which the lawyer does not
believe, histrionic tears, and attacks on the credibility of witnesses
known to be telling the truth.'0 2
It is evident that excessive zeal by advocates especially endowed
with talent, money, or moral callousness must often produce injustice.
We have no idea of the frequency of such miscarriages of justice. It is
an article of faith among most lawyers that a kind of expediency justi-
fies the occasional troublesome injustice: clients want the kind of zeal-
ous representation that entails some cost to justice, and they can always
get it from another lawyer, if not this one.
The argument is not always as crass as that. It can plausibly be
maintained that this kind of adversary system is preferable to available
alternatives even from the point of view of justice. It will be argued that
only fully committed lawyers will imaginatively develop the facts and
hypotheses that ought to be considered. Moreover, setting two lawyers
against each other to advocate opposing interpretations of the situation
is more likely to yield informed justice than, for example, reliance on
an inquisitorial judge to follow investigatory hunches based, perhaps,
99 See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 19.4 n.5 (1956).
100 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (1982).
101 See id. EC 7-13 (discussing the special responsibilities of public prosecutors);
C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.3.2 (1986) (qualifying this assertion
with the statement that this view "has been seriously eroded by the institution of pre-
trial discovery in civil cases"); id. DR 7-103(B) (requiring timely disclosure by public
prosecutors and other government lawyers to the defendant of exculpatory or mitigating
evidence).
102 See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 101, § 12.4.5.
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on initial bias.' 03
The issue is not whether to retain or abandon the adversary sys-
tem, but how to minimize injustice within that system. Consider, first,
that the adversary system is already substantially qualified in the inter-
est of justice. The obligation of the public prosecutor and other govern-
ment lawyers to do justice is explicitly recognized in the American Bar
Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility' and in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.' 05 Voices have begun to be heard
in favor of a "rule of reason" to temper overzealous advocacy in legisla-
tive and administrative proceedings involving major issues between gov-
ernment and industries regarding environmental hazards, safety stan-
dards for food and drugs, and the like.'0° There is the beginning of
recognition of the special obligations of securities lawyers to make dis-
closures to investors and regulatory agencies even where this may not
be in the interest of the client.'0 Lawyers for promoters of tax shelters
are likewise under pressure to be fair to the Treasury and to investors
in describing what may prove to be ineffective devices for tax eva-
sion.'08 One eminent legal ethics scholar has called for moral accounta-
bility of lawyers generally when they seek to promote their clients' un-
just goals, at least in settings where the lawyer acts as adviser rather
than as advocate before an impartial tribunal that also hears an advo-
cate for the other side. 09
103 See Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, 44 A.B.A.J.
1159, 1160-61 (1958) (L. Fuller and J. Randall, Co-Chairmen).
104 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1982) ("The
responsibility of a public prosecutor ... is to seek justice, not merely to convict .
[The prosecutor's decisions] affecting the public interest should be fair to all . . .
id. EC 7-14 (a government lawyer has the obligation to avoid "unfair litigation" and
"unjust settlements or results"); see also id. DR 7-103 (a government lawyer must not
prosecute when the charges are not supported by probable cause and must disclose all
evidence disproving or mitigating guilt).
105 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 comment (1983) ("A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate.").
108 Cf. M. WESSEL, THE RULE OF REASON: A NEW APPROACH TO CORPORATE
LITIGATION 19-24 (1976) (arguing for a new approach to litigation whereby lawyers
would refrain from delay and other procedural tactics inconsistent with the client's
publicized desire to resolve an issue quickly and fairly).
107 See generally T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
373-84 (3d ed. 1984) (cases and commentaries regarding the degrees of disclosure re-
quired or permitted under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and by the
Securities and Exchange Commission).
108 See id. at 359-60 (excerpting a speech by then-Treasury General Counsel
Mundheim expressing concern over the role of tax attorneys in promoting abusive tax
shelters).
109 See Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF.
L. REv. 669, 690-95 (1978); see also Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 554-63.
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An education in professional responsibility that is oriented towards
justice will have to address more difficult cases than the foregoing spe-
cial instances of "who is the client?" (securities issuer or investors? fee-
paying client or third parties?) or "who will act in reliance on the at-
torney's legal opinion?" There will be occasions when there is no ambi-
guity regarding the identity of the client, but simply a recognition by
the lawyer that the client has a legal advantage over the adversary and
that exploitation of this advantage will result in injustice. Here are
some illustrative cases:
(i) Defendant client has a valid defense under the stat-
ute of limitations because plaintiff's lawyer filed the action a
few days late;
(ii) A debt unquestionably incurred by defendant client
is unenforceable because the obligation was not recorded in
writing as required by law; and
(iii) Client is the named beneficiary under a will that
the testator unquestionably sought to revoke by written in-
structions for the preparation of a new will just before testa-
tors sudden death.
Most lawyers, trained in a stark adversary mold, will have little
trouble recognizing counsel's obligation under such circumstances. The
client's legal rights must be vindicated. The lawyer is to administer the
system as she finds it; her role is not that of a moral counselor.110 If the
question of justice is raised at all, such lawyers comfort themselves with
the idea that seemingly arbitrary requirements of timely action or for-
mality of wills, though occasionally functioning unfairly, overall pre-
vent more injustices than would follow from dispensing with the formal
requirements. Alleged torts would have to be litigated long after wit-
nesses had disappeared; spurious claims to decedents' estates would
multiply.
Such arguments of expediency are plausible but will not wholly
satisfy a lawyer committed to justice. Legal education should raise the
consciousness of lawyers to the level where we are all uncomfortable
with the potential injustice of such situations. That discomfort will pro-
duce palliative measures even if the basic principle of client entitlement
to everything the law affords remains embedded in our system. Legal
ethics is not all disciplinary rules, but on the contrary comprises much
that is aspirational or admonitory."' Why should young lawyers not be
110 But see Jones, Book Review, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 649, 650-51 (1982) (review-
ing T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981)).
"I See Hazard, Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional Aspirations, 30
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encouraged, where their personal relationships with the client will tol-
erate it, to counsel moderation in the exercise of undoubted legal
rights? The result might be no more than a proposal to settle pending
litigation in a way that would be favorable to the client holding the
legal trump cards but would also move in the direction of greater jus-
tice. That might even afford psychic satisfaction to the forbearing client
and improve its public relations!11 2 Any encouragement in the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility to take justice into account in ad-
vising clients on the exercise of legal rights would have to explicitly
exonerate the advising lawyer of any deficiency of zeal in representing
his client, and so forestall subsequent malpractice claims against the
lawyer.'13
Justice-oriented lawyers could also avoid the discomfort of involve-
ment in the unfair assertion of legal rights by promoting reform legisla-
tion to minimize the injustice often entailed in arbitrary requirements
of time and formality. The canons of professional ethics and the train-
ing of lawyers should encourage such reform activity.114 One possibility
for reform would be a provision tolling a statute of limitations where
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 571, 574 (1982).
112 See, e.g., M. WESSELL, supra note 106, at 10-12 (discussing the damage to the
business and corporate credibility of General Motors as a result of its investigation of
Ralph Nader).
11S Cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 comment (1983)
("A lawyer should act . . . with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a
lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client.").
This seems better than MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
101(A)(1) (1982), which orders the lawyer not to "[flail to seek the lawful objectives of
his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary
Rules." EC 7-9 hardly tempers the rigor of DR 7-101(A)(1) when it authorizes the
lawyer to "ask his client for permission to forego such [unjust] action." EC 7-10 then
pontificates that the duty of zeal "does not militate against [the lawyer's] concurrent
obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to
avoid the infliction of needless harm." Id. EC 7-9 to -10.
114 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1982) states that
"A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System." The accompanying Ethical
Consideration notes that "[r]ules of law are deficient if they are not just," and that a
lawyer who believes that a rule of law "causes or contributes to an unjust result"
should try to have it changed. Id. EC 8-2. Improvement should be sought "without
regard to the general interests or desires of clients or former clients." Id. EC 8-1. The
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) appear to have retreated, perhaps
unwittingly, from the explicit aspiration for "just" legislation. Rule 6.1, addressing the
lawyers' public service obligations, focuses on the obligation to render legal services to
the poor. It refers to "activities for improving the law" (without indicating who shall
define "improvement") as one way of satisfying the obligation to "render public interest
legal service." Id. at Rule 6.1. The "Model Code Comparison" for Rule 6.1 does not
even mention the disappearance of EC 8-1 and 8-2. Id. at Rule 6.1 Model Code Com-
parison. As for the former admonition to seek reform even at a cost to client interests,
the new resolution of this conflict in Model Rule 6.4 merely permits lawyers to partici-
pate in reform activities that "may affect" client interests. Id. at Rule 6.4.
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the delay is marginal, excusable, and does not impair the likelihood of a
just result upon trial. Another possibility would be a two-stage statute
of limitations, with complete foreclosure of the action only at a later
time. At the first stage, the action could be maintained, but only with a
heavier burden of proof, i.e., beyond a "preponderance" of the evidence
to "clear and convincing" evidence, or even proof "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Provision might be made for dismissal if the defendant demon-
strates that delay has impaired the likelihood of a just result at trial, as
by the death of a critical witness. Similarly, an old will, not lacking in
formal requirements, might be made subject to revocation or modifica-
tion based on unequivocal recent evidence that it no longer embodied
the testator's purposes. Adoption of such reform measures, while clearly
costing the system some amount of expediency in the form of simple
adjudication of matters, would place the proper emphasis on justice to
the individual litigants.
G. Justice, Judging, and Precedent
I shall begin the discussion of this point by evoking a bit of ancient
history: the growth of separate courts of equity to ameliorate the rigid-
ity and harshness of "the law," and the eventual amalgamation of eq-
uity and law into the same courts. 115 The courts of equity long ago
restrained the grasping lender's over-hasty assertion of title to mort-
gaged property. They created the debtor's equity of redemption, the
right of the debtor to reclaim the pledged property, regardless of literal
provisions of the loan contract transferring ownership to the creditor
upon default, until a judge ordered foreclosure of the debtor's inter-
est."1 In other contexts, formal defects would be overlooked if they pre-
vented the enjoyment of substantive rights: "equity regards as done that
which ought to be done.' 1 7 Injunctions would be granted in the inter-
ests of justice if damages, the ordinary relief afforded by courts of law,
would not compensate for the wrong done." 8 Equitable defenses devel-
oped: estoppel, unclean hands, laches. The eventual merger of law and
equity epitomizes the process of continual reincorporation of justice into
judging, a process whose extension this essay supports.
If doing justice in light of something more than public policy or
expediency is accepted as the primary function of courts, I foresee a
115 See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 21-23 (1973)
(discussing the history of and the differences between courts of common law and courts
of equity and their eventual merger).
116 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.3 (1973).
117 Id. § 2.3 n.24.
118 See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 115, at 22.
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change in the role of precedent. Too often the argumentation of law-
yers, and consequently the rationalization that judges' opinions provide
for their decisions, relies exclusively upon precedent. But old answers
do not reliably serve as solutions to new problems. Instead of looking
backwards to decide what to do presently, the judge should be guided
by a self-imposed mandate to do the right thing presently, unless pre-
vented from exercising her best judgment by a clear mandate from the
past. Absent an indistinguishable recent precedent by a higher court or
an unequivocal legislative direction, justice should be the deciding crite-
rion. Under that guideline, precedent would still retain much of its sig-
nificance, but its role would be reduced to a potential veto of any single
judge's subjective view of what justice calls for in a given situation.
A subordinate role for precedent is quite consistent with the poli-
cies embodied in respect for precedent. I would list those policies as
follows:
(i) respect for the legal system can be maintained only
by assuring equal protection of the law, i.e., that decisions in
like circumstances will be the same regardless of litigants'
connections or of personal biases of the judge;
(ii) expectations reasonably evoked by earlier decisions
and relied upon by people in their commercial and other ar-
rangements ought to be fulfilled or at least not disregarded;
disappointment of such expectations would be felt as an in-
justice;'19 and
(iii) individual judges should respect, but not abdicate
to, the collective wisdom of fellow judges; such a consensus of
fellow judges is hardly to be inferred from a single prece-
dent, especially if judges in other states have reached a dif-
ferent conclusion.
All of these policies serve to enhance the perceived legitimacy of
courts and government. °20 The rendering of a manifestly unjust deci-
sion undermines the perceived legitimacy of courts and government
even though the decision appears to follow precedent. Yet the issue is
too complicated for any simple answer. The perceived legitimacy of a
judicial decision will also suffer if settled ideals of separation of powers
are violated, as when a court's effort to do justice in a particular case
seems to carry the court into the realm constitutionally assigned to the
legislature or the executive.
119 See, e.g., E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 20-22 (1949).
120 On the "legitimating" function of courts, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH 29-33, 129-32 (1962).
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Focusing on justice as the critical responsibility of judges may call
for reexamination of the scope of judicial review of administrative deci-
sions. Should we stick with the prevailing view that authorizes an ap-
pellate court to set aside an administrative order not supported by sub-
stantial evidence, or an order issued by an administrative agency that
failed to follow prescribed procedures? Or should judicial review be
more circumscribed, limited perhaps to situations in which the agency
acted outside its jurisdiction or manifest injustice has been done?12'
This sounds like a radical proposal until one remembers that lack of
jurisdiction was once the prevailing criterion of judicial review in this
country.'
22
There are signs of a return of American doctrine towards the older
narrow view of the role of courts of general jurisdiction in reviewing
administrative determinations.123 In the Hope Natural Gas case,' 24 the
Supreme Court upheld a rate reduction ordered by the Federal Power
Commission although the Commission's decision involved a radical de-
parture from prior law regarding rate base 125 and a dubious exclusion
from the rate base of certain assets that the company's books recorded
as having been expensed in prior years. 126 The court found it unneces-
sary to pass on the lawfulness of the exclusion because a review of the
record persuaded the court that the result reached would still enable
Hope to earn a fair return. 27 Affirmance of an administrative decision
without addressing plausible claims of error suggests a narrowing of
the role of the court in administration.
I neither favor nor forecast a sharp turnabout in the law of judi-
cial review of administrative decisions. The practicalities of administra-
121 The scope of judicial review of federal agency orders is determined by the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). It provides that agency orders
shall be set aside if the agency acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, if it acted
outside its jurisdiction, if it failed to observe required procedures, or if the order was
unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at § 706(2).
121 See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 28.02 (3d ed. 1972)
(discussing the evolution from a common law presumption that administrative action
was not reviewable to the contrary modern presumption); J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 41-47, 307-332
(1927) (discussing the "ultra vires" theory of judicial review).
123 See Mikva, The Changing Role of Judicial Review, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 115,
140 (1986) (arguing that courts should now "paint with a fine brush" as
"[a]dministrative law has progressed to the point where we have a reasonably workable
and finely detailed body of doctrine").
124 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
125 Id. at 648 (separate opinion of Jackson, J.).
121 See id. at 624 (Reed, J., dissenting).
127 See id. at 605. Cf. Southern La. Area Rate Cases v. Federal Power Comm'n,
428 F.2d 407, 439 (5th Cir.), (affirming agency decision despite "serious misgivings" as
to a central issue), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
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tive law are that regulated industries tend to acquire dominant influ-
ence over the agencies supposed to control them."'8 New appointees to a
commission can drastically revise the impact of the law they administer,
with little or no reference to the statutory language or congressional
intent.129 The political and commercial pressures on. agencies tend to
convert them into forums for compromise between pressure groups.130
This process should not remain unchecked, free of the rationalizing dis-
cipline of the relatively independent judicial system. 3 What is here
being argued is only that judges who perceive their primary input into
the system as "justice" will be cautious not to intervene too much in the
managerial and executive functions of administrative agencies.
A national resolve to identify judging with doing justice would
lead to reconsideration of some inappropriate allocations of administra-
tive responsibilities to judges. Traffic courts, for example, are not en-
gaged in doing justice, as can be seen in the fact that strict liability
(without proof of fault) prevails, that nearly all controversies are settled
without trial, and that in the few cases tried defendants need not be
provided with counsel as required in ordinary prosecutions. 32 Have we
not a case here for ending this pretense of doing justice and transferring
this operation to an administrative agency? Such a structure could fol-
low precedents for extricating judges from the routine business of
awarding compensations or entitlements. Consider, for example, the
shift from tort litigation in courts to administrative awards under work-
12S See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMIS-
SION 90-95 (1955) (capture occurs when consumer coalition that caused agency to be
formed dies out); R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS 19-20 (1985) (phenomenon called "agency capture" exists when an agency
favors the concerns of the industry it regulates over the interests of the general public).
129 See, e.g., Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1061 (1975) (discussing the chief executive's significant opportu-
nities to influence the conduct of administrative agencies through the appointment
power); Norman, The Strange Career of the Civil Rights Division's Commitment to
Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 983, 989 (1984) (noting the current Justice Department strategy
of urging the abandonment of busing).
130 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text; see also Jaffe, The Illusion of
the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1190-91 (1973) (discussing the
effect of the political process on operation of administrative agencies).
121 Compare Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Indus-
tries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 464-71 (1954)
(arguing for a narrow scope of the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction") with Scalia, Reg-
ulatory Reform-The Game Has Changed, REG., Jan./Feb. 1981, at 13 (arguing that
the appointment of Republican deregulation-prone administrators should lead conserv-
atives to help free the agencies from procedural constraints and judicial review).
132 See, e.g., Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 72-73, 84
(1933) (listing offenses for which mens rea need not be proven, and arguing that this
should be confined to public welfare offenses).
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men's compensation laws." s
Judges should not be vested, as they are in many states, with the
power to appoint members of school boards, tax commissioners, park
commissioners, and the like.134 One can understand the impulse to in-
sulate certain public offices from "political" influence by vesting ap-
pointment powers in judges believed to be somewhat isolated from
politics. But experience reveals that this arrangement more often em-
broils the judges in politics. Confining judges more closely to the justice
business would clarify their primary responsibility and enhance
legitimacy.
Finally, getting judges out of administration, so that they become
more exclusively enforcers of justice, would have implications for the
kinds of decrees the courts should issue. Ways should be found to avoid
involving courts in prolonged day-to-day administration of prisons,
schools, or voting systems."3 5 The spectacle of bankruptcy courts ad-
ministering vast debtors' estates and corporate receiverships for years
upon years, organizing successor corporations, holding off some greedy
competitors and yielding to others as expediency may require builds an
image of the judge as an involved actor, not a detached dispenser of
justice.1 36
133 See I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 5.20, 5.30
(1984). But see Love, Actions for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the
Tort System and No-Fault Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers' Compensa-
tion), 73 CAL. L. REV. 857, 877-78 (1985) (suggesting that some jurisdictions may be
on verge of allowing tort damages in addition to workers' compensation for harm not
covered by workers' compensation).
134 See, e.g., Schweit, End to Court Appointed Election Panels Urged, Chicago
Daily L. Bull., Feb. 26, 1987, at 1 col. 2.
135 Cf 15 U.S.C. § 47 (1982) (authorizing a court to refer cases to the Federal
Trade Commission as "master in chancery" for aid in framing a decree). The issue of
court involvement in protracted programs to reform other government institutions has
received extensive scholarly discussion. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1298-1302, 1313 (1976); Horowitz, The
Judiciary: Umpire or Empire, 6 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 129, 129-130 (1982) (arguing
that it is inappropriate for federal courts to labor in the unfamiliar terrain of adminis-
tration of various social programs); Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Re-
medial Special Masters in Federal Institutional Reform Litigation: The History Re-
considered, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 753, 795-805 (1984) (discussing the authority
arising from FED. R. Civ. P. 53); Mishkin, John Randolph Tucker Lecture: Federal
Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 950 (1978) (challenging the
"regularization" of "institutional decrees" and the "acceptance of the set of mind that,
having identified a real social problem, too easily concludes . . . that judges must there-
fore act in a wholesale fashion to reform government to bring about the 'cure' ");
Frickey & Levine, Book Review, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 270, 276-280 (1986) (re-
viewing D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984)).
136 See, e.g., In re New York, N.H.&H.R.R., 632 F.2d 955, 957-59 (2d Cir.)
(chronicling over three decades of bankruptcy reorganization and judicial management),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1062 (1980). See generally Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary
and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 485-86
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Even an enthusiast for the antitrust laws may experience misgiv-
ings when the monopoly prosecution against AT&T is settled on a ba-
sis that converts a federal judge into a specialized Federal Communica-
tions Commission passing on issues such as the right of successor
telephone companies to engage in data processing, selling office equip-
ment, providing construction services abroad, or any other operation
that management desires to undertake."' 7 Such diversification may be
quite undesirable;. 8 but the issue is plainly expediency, not justice.
I hasten to say that I am not opposed to receiverships as an ulti-
mate remedy for basically malfunctioning public agencies, whether they
be prisons, school boards, police departments, or hospitals for the men-
tally ill. Litigation to achieve institutional reform may be the only real-
istic leverage against the legislative or bureaucratic apathy that permits
constitutional outrages to continue."3 Judges' decrees, however, should
distance the court from daily administration and extricate them from
ongoing responsibility at the earliest feasible moment. Perhaps the exe-
cution of complex, continuing administrative remedies for illegalities
found by courts should be entrusted to an appropriate regulatory
agency. There would be reserved for courts only the usual judicial re-
view of administrative action, such review concerning itself with injus-
tice, not prudence or expediency.
H. Justice and Organization of the Executive Branch
Recognition of the uniqueness of justice as a concern of govern-
ment would have important implications for the structure of the execu-
tive branch of government. The Department of Justice would be the
most affected; it could be freed of its compromising entanglement with
bureaucratic administration in such fields as immigration and naturali-
zation, prison administration, alien property controls, and ongoing reg-
(1980) (describing judicial use of administrative powers when managing institutions as
a result of bankruptcy and reorganization litigation).
I"7 For an extensive discussion of the role played by U.S. District Judge Harold
H. Green, see S. COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T
(1986). See also Schwartz, Forum and Substance: Introduction to the Symposium, 9
COMM./ENT. 1 (1986) (symposium on the divestiture of AT&T).
138 See generally Schwartz, Diversification and Regulated Utilities-What's Next
for the Telephone Holding Companies?, 7 COMM./ENT. 195 (1985) (discussing diver-
sification in the telecommunications industry).
139 See Chayes, supra note 135, at 1307-09; Levine, supra note 135, at 753-56.
Prof. Levine's review (with P.P. Frickey) of THE WILLOWBROOK WARS, Frickey &
Levine, supra note 135, at 271-76, thoughtfully canvasses the issues in the context of
judicial intervention to remedy intolerable conditions at "an abysmal state institution
for the mentally retarded." Id. at 270.
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ulation of corporate structure and operations.14 The governing princi-
ple should be the minimization of conflicts of interest that arise when a
single agency combines the functions of doer and judge of its own do-
ing. Running a prison system entails entrepreneurial, custodial, educa-
tional, and supply functions comparable to operating a chain of hotels
or hospitals.141 In the course of such operations, injustice may be done
to prisoners. But that is no more reason for incorporating the Bureau of
Prisons into the Justice Department than it would be for incorporating
the Internal Revenue Service into the Department on the ground that
numerous grave injustices have been perpetrated by the Internal Reve-
nue Service.
Moreover, when allegations of injustice, perhaps amounting to
cruel and unusual punishment, are brought by inmates of a penal insti-
tution, the government ought not be represented by an Attorney Gen-
eral who was directly or indirectly responsible for the allegedly inhu-
mane conditions. Rather, it should be represented by a Department of
Justice that can take a stance to some degree independent of the client,
a stance in which it is more likely that the ethical canon calling upon
government lawyers to moderate their adversary posture" 2 will be ob-
served. The Justice Department has no more claim to run the prison
system than have the courts which send the prisoners there. The an-
cient sentencing formula by which the convict is committed to the cus-
tody of the Attorney General is plainly an anachronism dating back to
an era of monarchical discretionary justice, before the development of a
doctrine of separation of powers.
In the field of immigration and naturalization, there is a long his-
tory of hardships too easily imposed upon groups whose very right to
be here may be questioned. 43 The policies to be implemented are
chiefly matters of international relations, labor relations, humane treat-
ment of political or economic refugees, and border patrol-hardly mat-
ters to which a Department of Justice can claim special expertise.
1 44
140 For a general overview of the Department of Justice and a description of its
relationship with these various fields of law, see OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER,
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, 1986/87 THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 338-71 (1986) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT MANUAL].
141 The Department of Justice is in the prison business running foui U.S. peni-
tentiaries, 20 federal correctional institutions, and 19 federal prison camps. See id. at
358-60.
142 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1982).
143 See E. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY, 1798-1965, at 461-77 (1981).
144 Principal authority for the administration of the immigration and naturaliza-
tion laws, as well as for enforcing its provisions against lawbreakers, is vested in the
Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982). For a discussion of the role of the
Department of Justice in the formulation, administration, and enforcement of the im-
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The Department's repute for evenhanded justice in this area is compro-
mised by involvement in the formulation and execution of policies that
inevitably restrain human liberty and entail discrimination based on
ethnicity, country of origin, political views, and motivations in seeking
refuge. The notorious Palmer raids of the 1920's, carried out against
"foreign anarchists," remain a byword of lawless political action by the
Justice Department.
145
Civil liberty and justice would be better protected if the Depart-
ment entered the picture clean of any involvement in the confrontations.
That is the way it regularly operates in representing executive agencies
before the Supreme Court, where it is free to confess error or otherwise
vindicate notions of the higher interests of the government as a whole,
including justice. 46
Although the case for a realignment of functions between the De-
partment of Justice and other executive departments is here argued pri-
marily on the basis of the desirability of institutionalizing a higher pri-
ority for justice over administration, it is worth noting that such
realignment would also promote efficiency. Where an independent
agency such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Food and
Drug Administration, or the Postal Inspectors (law enforcement branch
of the Post Office) has cases to bring before the courts, little is gained
by interposing Justice Department monitoring between the agency and
the local district attorney and court. My own observation, as an attor-
ney first for the Securities and Exchange Commission and later in the
Criminal Division of the Justice Department, was that such monitoring
slowed operation, multiplied paperwork, dispersed responsibility, and
too often afforded an opportunity to bring political influences to bear
against proposed prosecutions. A reorganization of the executive
migration laws, see T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POL-
IcY 81-93 (1985). The possibilities for and reality of conflicts and confusion of roles
arising from the potential incompatibility of the tasks of administering and enforcing
the immigration laws are explored in SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFU-
GEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 238-44
(1981); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL
RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 40-43 (1980).
145 See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 144, at 352-55; E. HULL,
WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 16-17
(1985); see also Note, Statutory and Constitutional Limitations on the Idefinite De-
tention of Excluded Aliens, 62 B.U.L. REV. 553, 553-55 (1982) (arguing that the
Justice Department's refusal to terminate the confinement in camps in Miami of Cu-
ban nationals who attempted to immigrate to the United States was an abuse of
discretion).
148 See Caplan, The Tenth Justice (pt. 1), NEw YORKER, Aug. 10, 1987, at 32
("The Justices ... count on [the Solicitor General] to look beyond the government's
narrow interests. They rely on him to help guide them to the right result in the case at
hand, and to pay close attention to the impact of the case on the law itself.").
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branch, focusing upon the inherent conflicts faced by those who must
formulate, enforce, and judge their own policies, would serve the pro-
motion of justice at no expense to expediency.
III. THE PRESS AND THE PERCEIVED JUSTNESS OF GOVERNMENT
My theory of justice, which relates it to beauty and the sense of
the fitness of judgment to circumstances, puts great emphasis on the
aesthetic responses of citizen observers. If there is a consensus that the
regime governs justly, not perhaps perfectly, but as justly as human
political institutions can manage, the regime will be stable; the citizenry
will feel secure, and the government's legitimacy will be proof against
violent overthrow. Manifesting the legitimacy of government is one of
the most important functions of judging, as well as of lawmaking and
elections. 147 However, the theory encounters obvious problems that
must be confronted. One is the question of whose perceptions should
count.
It will not do to say that a lynch mob is doing justice even if, by
giving expression to vengeful or ethnic passions, it gratifies most mem-
bers of the community. That would be akin to abdicating literary or
artistic criticism to the most vulgar tastes. Nor should the ultimate ver-
dict on justice be made by professional critics: persons educated in law,
philosophy, morals, and political science. Refined critics of law and
.government are likely to be members of the elite of society, beneficiaries
of the status quo. They are not sufficiently representative of the com-
munity that their favorable judgments would necessarily lend legiti-
macy to government.
Besides, it is notorious that the professional critics are divided
amongst themselves and are perhaps least reliable when they close
ranks. When they do agree, the apparent consensus is likely to be at-
tributable to the development of a priesthood that dominates the schools
in which new critics are trained to orthodoxy. Rejecting the infallibility
of that priesthood does not, however, mean that it has an unimportant
role to play in the critique of justice. Basically, its role is to aid the self-
education of a political society. Their analyses, especially their conflict-
ing analyses, illuminate the issues and emphasize the importance of ra-
tionality. It remains for the judges and the press to integrate the critics'
insights into the consciousness of the community.
If the professional critics are insufficiently representative to make
their views determinative of justice, one might suppose that elected rep-
'47 See 1 ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 115 (J. Henley trans., R. Tasker ed.
1973) ("Set justice aside then, and what are kingdoms but fair thievish purchases?").
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resentatives of the people, i.e., legislators, are best qualified to decide
what is just. The views of the legislature are, indeed, entitled to weight
in this regard, and a judiciary that is perceived to disregard the legisla-
ture gambles with its own repute as a defender of justice. On the other
hand, few things are better settled in our community conscience than
awareness that a legislature may enact unjust laws which the judiciary
is obliged to disregard as unconstitutional . 48 Legislatures, as well, may
be imperfectly representative of the electorate, especially when the elec-
tive process becomes prohibitively expensive and candidates conse-
quently become unduly responsive to voters that can provide money. 49
Possibilities of corruption aside, even a representative legislature can
act like a surrogate lynch mob giving crude expression to the will of a
tyrannical majority.'"0 Procedural protections of accused persons can be
harshly constricted in consequence of public outrage over a jury's ac-
quittal of a person whom the press has already convicted. Political and
148 See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW 135-36 (1980) (arguing that the role of the court is the protection of those groups
that the political process fails to protect).
14" The money raised and spent on political campaigns is staggering. The Repub-
licans collected $107 million for their 1986 Senate campaigns; the Democrats collected
$79 million. Berke, GOP Millions Didn't Save Senate, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1987, at
A28, col. 3. Senate candidates spent a record $155 million on their 1986 campaigns;
their House colleagues spent $187 million. Tolchin, Record Spending in Congressional
Campaign Had Mixed Result at Polls, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at A18, col. 1
(citing FEC records). Those campaigns rely on the support of political action commit-
tees ("PACs"). PACs contributed $44 million of the $186 million raised in the 1986
campaigns. Berke, supra, at A28, col. 3. PAC contributions are heavily weighted to-
wards incumbents; 83% of their contributions in the 1986 elections went to reelection
campaigns. Molotsky & Weaver, New Fodder in PAC Wars, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
1986, at A16, col. 1.
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the right of individuals to contribute
to PACs and the right of individuals and PACs to contribute to political campaigns. See
Fed. Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 105 S. Ct.
1459, 1467 (1985) (individual participation in political action committees and PAC
participation in federal elections is protected by first amendment freedom of associa-
tion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1975) (per curiam) (the giving and spending of
money in a political campaign is included in first amendment protected areas of politi-
cal association and political expression). Although the Court has recognized that the
right to political association and expression "is diluted if it does not include the right to
pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if 'advocacy' is to be
truly and optimally 'effective'," Id. at 65-66, it has allowed federal restrictions on indi-
vidual contributions to PACs and campaigns, and PAC contributions to campaigns. Id.
at 58 (limitations "serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of
the electoral process"). The government cannot, however, limit a candidates expendi-
ture on her own behalf, limit overall campaign expenditures, id., or limit individual
and group expenditures to support or oppose ballot measures, Citizens Against Rent
Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981).
150 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 132 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961)
(popular government enables a majority faction to "sacrifice to its ruling passion or
interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens").
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religious rights of minorities can be overridden.
This brings us to the role of the press. Given that it is the percep-
tion of justice done that contributes to the legitimacy of government, it
is clear that the mass media plays a crucial role. If the government,
following a widely publicized crime or civil disturbance, selected a
scapegoat without regard to guilt or innocence, for example by chance
or by secret political determination, uncritical or laudatory reporting by
the press would create the impression that law and order had been
vindicated and justice done.
On the other hand, the press can unjustifiably undermine respect
for the law and the legitimacy of government through misleading re-
porting.151 Trumpeting that a defendant who is plainly guilty has been
held "innocent," when in truth he has merely been acquitted because
the proof, even though conducive to belief in guilt, did not exclude rea-
sonable doubt, certainly undermines respect for the courts. If the press
does not handle cases in a manner that invites consideration of the clas-
sic safeguards of innocence and of the price that must be paid for them,
the court's judgment will be wrongly perceived as unjust.
A more serious press failure that distorts understanding of justice
occurs in the reporting of convictions reversed because of a violation of
the Bill of Rights in the course of prosecution.1" 2 It is not uncommon
for such decisions to be reported in the spirit of "criminal escapes pun-
ishment on technicality." Rarely do the news articles make clear that
*reversal of conviction because of unconstitutional police behavior leads
not to escape but to a retrial without the unlawful evidence. The reader
is not reminded that rules such as those regulating arrest, search, inter-
rogation, and right to counsel exist in order to protect ordinary unof-
fending citizens from harassment by the government, even though the
rules are unavoidably invoked by persons perceived as guilty.
It is, of course, possible to loosen the reins on the police and catch
1 See, e.g., T. LEONARD, THE POWER OF THE PRESS: THE BIRTH OF AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL REPORTING (1986) (discussion of how the press came to shape Ameri-
can attitudes toward government from the revolutionary era to the early 1900's); S.
LICHTER, 'S. ROTHMAN & L. LICHTER, THE MEDIA ELITE: AMERICA'S NEW
POWERBROKERS (1986) (study exploring media reporting of the safety of nuclear
power, busing for racial integration, and the oil companies' role in the energy crunch);
D. SCHILLER, OBJEcTIvITY AND THE NEWS: THE PUBLIC AND THE RISE OF COM-
MERCIAL JOURNALISM 179-197 (1981) (discussion of the rise of the press in the United
States); Muravchick, Misreporting Lebanon, 23 POL'y REv. 11, 62 (1983) (U.S. news
media coverage of the war and seige in Lebanon "[t]oo often . . . was flawed by inac-
curacies, imbalance, and hyperbolic or tendentious reporting").
5 See generally R. DRECHSEL, NEWS MAKING IN THE TRIAL COURTS 1-9,
152-56 (1983) (criticism of court coverage and selected bibliography of related studies
and articles); S. ZAGRI, FREE PRESS, FAIR TRIAL 3-10 (1966) (case study of trial by
press).
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a few more criminals, but only at the price of many more unpleasant
police intrusions on ordinary people. As we are constantly reminded by
economists and conservative politicians, there is no such thing as a free
lunch. If we desire a society uncowed by police, we must be prepared to
accept fewer arrests and convictions. But standard journalism seldom
provides the public with any sense that the tiny fraction of prosecutions
aborted by vindication of constitutional rights has little bearing on the
deterrent force of the law. The main impact of the constitutional provi-
sions is on the police, who in their normal operations comply with the
requirements of the Constitution. This hidden cost of conformity with
the Bill of Rights means that, because of our commitment to the Con-
stitution, vastly more suspects escape at the police level than at the
court level. Normal police compliance accepts the social cost of fewer
arrests, a cost that the constitutional Fathers-who had no illusions
about free lunches-clearly chose to incur.
CONCLUSION
The idea of justice should have a larger explicit role in teaching,
practice, and judging. Justice is something beyond public policy or ex-
pediency. Especially, it has an aesthetic dimension that I call beauty.
Are these true or meaningful propositions? I don't know. Their merit,
if any, may lie in their quality of provocative error, error that evokes
critical response and leads to new synthesis. I have played this jurispru-
dential game despite the fact that I am as skeptical of jurisprudence as
I am of economics and sociology. All these rhetorics are, to me, like
music and chess, mysteries to which humans are pardonably addicted.
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